in an effort to gain respectability as a learned society or guild, philosophers of education gave up social relevancy for academic respectability. In an effort to navigate the treacherous path between and among professionalism and social relevancy, this paper takes up an area of professional philosophy-epistemology-with the intention of reclaiming the integrative role John Dewey held for philosophy and classroom practice.
That is, I wish to revive a particular epistemological view in order to bridge the professional field of epistemology with classroom practice.
As an area within professional philosophy, epistemology went through a variety of transformations in the twentieth century. From traditional accounts of knowledge favored by analytic philosophers to the relativists' outright rejection of epistemology as a valuable area of inquiry, epistemology was tossed around and sometimes tossed out of many investigations. Still, but not unproblematically, epistemology as a term continued to be used in discourse concerning pure knowledge, practical knowledge, social constructed knowledge, and the like. Aside from those professional philosophers who took up the area of epistemology as a primary focus of study, 3 epistemology seemed to both fall out of favor as a major area of focus for those interested in education and schooling and fall into favor as a buzzword to add an aura of respectability to various research articles and agendas.
The term "epistemology" has been widely sprinkled amid myriad articles, but as a primary focus of work in the area of education, the field is rarely evidenced. As regards This is not, of course, a criticism of any of the theorists or their work. The point is simply to indicate that specific inquiry into Dewey's epistemology, per se, is rare in the pages of this journal. For philosophy of education, more broadly, I wonder whether the occasional forays into epistemology failed to become a primary focus because epistemology, generally, was (and is?) seen as suffering from a hypertrophied and myopic focus on traditional accounts of "pure" knowledge.
Historical Considerations for Connecting and Clarifying Deweyan Epistemology
The relatively recent history of epistemology included and was dominated by Russell, Frege, Moore, and others committed to an analytic view of professional philosophy. Language, correspondence theories, independent reality, and foundationalism were major foci at the beginning of the twentieth century. James, Dewey, and other pragmatists, however, launched an attack on the analytic approach in the early 1900s and Dewey and Russell engaged in well-known debates about the nature of knowledge and the various requirements for one to be said to know anything at all.
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Just prior to Russell, however, were other critics like new realists and critical realists. question. 18 One arguable result is that those interested in a pragmatic theory of knowledge find themselves continually mounting their defense in terms of traditional epistemology, contrasting though the terms may be. Another result seems to me to be a dearth of inquiry that bridges the work of professional philosophers studying epistemology with philosophers of education studying epistemology and linking it to classroom practice.
One consequence, then, appears to be that in the process of rejecting various major components of epistemology, the enterprise of inquiring into knowledge and knowing has largely been discredited or disregarded-at least to the degree that those in education are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning epistemology (and those within epistemology are rarely if ever part of the larger conversation concerning education "knowing" is. "Knowledge" represents the end of inquiry but, according to Dewey, it is also often supposed to have a meaning of its own-disconnected from inquiry. The result is that inquiry is subordinated to the fixed end called "knowledge." 24 By
"knowing" Dewey means inquiry in a world that is not static. He means inquiry into things "lived" by people. He means experimenting with solving problems such that the action entailed in the solving of problems is inquiry itself and warranted in the assertions made about the solved problem when it is solved (where "solved" is understood as temporal and a portal to further inquiry). Accordingly, in the "living" of life, problems will be faced and solved-often in serendipitous ways-such that achieving "justified true belief" (as traditional epistemology expects) is not useful. As Dewey put it:
[Warranted assertion] is preferred to the terms belief and knowledge [because] it is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion. When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means "warranted assertibility." The use of a term that designates potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions of special inquiries are parts of enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going concern. Language is a tool to make sense of our experiences, but it derives its meaning and utility from our lives.
Our lives should be guided, on Dewey's view, by inquiry: "the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole." 26 Knowing comes about when inquiry leads to an understanding that goes beyond mere apprehension. One might "understand," i.e., "apprehend" the ideas of moose, chemical elements, or musical notes, but knowing requires having a sense of grounds (the "warrant") for asserting their existence. 27 This is a key point to which I will return later in discussing warranted assertions and classroom practice.
Before then, however, consider how traditional notions like "truth" and "proposition" in the history of epistemology differ from elements within Dewey's theory of inquiry. matter is not the words, but the logical properties characteristic of different subject-matters. 34 Warranted assertibility, for Dewey, was part of a project to explain (1) what it means to say that a statement about how things are may or may not correspond to how things actually are, when at the same time, (2) it is not possible to step back and treat this correspondence as if it were a matter of comparing the statement against bare re Burke puts it this way: "It is not as if we have some statement-independent handle on bare reality so that we can hold it up to compare against our statements, since it is th statements themselves and the processes that go into their making which are one's han on bare reality." ality. 36 What we have to do is make judgments in "real time" about consequences of actions in solving actual problems. Correspondence, then, becomes a metaphor for Dewey, allowing him to point out that while a "spectator" version of detachment is not completely wrong, n use information from their lives to solves problems that they face. The relevance of the "spectator" is in the very detachment Dewey eschews. "Spectators" don't assert, they passively observe. "Spectators" are outside of experience-at least the kind of experience that is engaging of others.
For Dewey, the speculative enterprise of traditional epistemology suffered gre at the hands of "correspondence" theories because, as he wrote in 1941, "wondering at how something in experience could be asserted to correspond to something by de y, "Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," Journal of 7 (1941) trates a connection between expected consequences and actual consequences.
Knowing, Knowledge, and Intelligence: Epistemology Goes to School
Here it may be helpful to distinguish between a few key concepts in order to better understand the import of warranted assertibility and its relationship to cl interaction. Knowing, knowledge, and intelligence are distinct for Dewey. Knowing is an inquiry (specific instances of applying oneself to solving problems), know constitutes the stable outcomes of inquiry, and intelligence is the result of the development and accumulation of capabilities to act (i.e., inquire) in spe is, intelligent action is action constructed in the light of properly anticipated consequences. "Knowledge is the result of successful inquiry, whereas knowing consists in using one's intelligence in given inquiries. Intelligence is stabilized knowledge…which can be utilized in positions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth," 183. ...from the standpoint of empirical naturalism, the denotative reference of "m and "intelligence" is to funding of meanings and significances, a funding which i both a product of past inquiries or knowings and the means of enriching and controlling the subject-matters of subsequent experiences. The function of enrichment and control is exercised by incorpo experience in attitudes and habits which, in their interaction with the environment, create the clearer, better ordered, "fuller" or richer materials of later experienc a process capable of indefinite continuance.
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What we have in this quite is Dewey's basic argument for classroom interaction. Organ and natural environments for learning impel knowing and the habits of intelligence.
Detachment from natural environments for learning foster "spectating" and habits of routine. When one supports a quest a for "meanings and significances," one sides with inquiry via warranted assertions. That is, given Dewey's epistemology, classrooms should be places where students make knowledge claims at the very same time they a engaged in knowing (inquiry), since the means and ends are not separable for Dewey, since the point of inquiry is not to college detached artifacts or pieces of the dead wood of the past. For the second point from above, when prospective teachers enter their course work as education majors (or for certification), it is not without ideas and experiences that inform what they want to do and how they want to do it, it simply is with virtually no change whatsoever in the culture from which they came. They were reared as spectator (and often spectate in their college classes, too) and even when some students pro wanting to "engage" their students in "active" learning, it still usually ends up being a souped-up version of traditional schooling-or as Dewey puts it Experience and Education, using "devices of art to cover up obviously brutal features. To envision classroom practices that specifically endorse warranted assertions would mean that students and teachers would no longer search for or operate under assumption of "the truth" in Platonic, Kantian, or "No Child Left Behind" terms. Instead students/teachers would make assertions connected to solving their problems (both immediate and connected to as-yet-unknown areas) that are gauged (i.e., judged) with the bounds of human experience. This not only represents an epistemological shift, it shifts power away from the traditional quest for certainty and places power wi and also not divorced from parent and social interaction. In short, traditional epistemology and an entailing power structure that supports it may be largely to for the general lack of inquiry found within U.S. classrooms. Students as testable objects themselves, and whose role it is to gather discreet bits of data and information (knowledge?), are repeatedly subjected to a classroom sphere where the only e relation is between teacher-and curriculum-imposed artifacts and superimposed goal
As has been alluded to, even good teachers are burdened by the perversion of correspondence seen most schools. Never mind that the tests that are claimed to be "objective" and "neutral" are subjectively constructed-all the tests, the standar mission statements, the learning objectives. It makes little difference. Because the presentation of that reality is repeated as "the real world" or "the way it is," its unassailability is arguably the very feature privileged by STK in traditional epistemology.
It seems as though the "view from nowhere" is precisely the view most educato onal policy makers repeatedly expect. It is no wonder, then, that most pub school classrooms continue to be stultifying arenas for external indoctrination.
Dewey's epistemology, however, is an offering. It is a possible "out." It represents one way students and teachers might develop relations in less contrived ways that what currently goes on in most schools. By shifting roles of teachers and students s that both groups are inquirers into problems they face, certitude goes out the window as the expectation for certitude is challenged. In place of certainty (the entailing result STK and correspondence theories of truth) is stability and it com
